Belisarius: The Last Roman General (51 page)

In Africa, the Vandals had become politically fragmented and open to attack. Their realm had fallen after a war of only nine months’ duration. During the course of the Vandalic War a similar series of events occurred in Italy, with Gothic political disunion mirroring the earlier situation in Vandal Africa. To a religious individual like Justinian, such a repetition may have appeared like a sign from God. It would seem likely to Justinian that this was a God-given opportunity and that an invasion of Italy would result in a rapid victory as had occurred in Africa.

Indeed, up until the capture of Rome Justinian’s belief would have seemed well-founded. The whole of the south of Italy fell, with only Naples offering any resistance and with a mass surrender of the defenders in the region. When Belisarius retook Rome, Justinian would have been extremely satisfied with the course of his reign: large areas in the west retaken at minimal loss. The fact that the war would drag on for over twenty years would not have been obvious at the time.

Furthermore, events in Spain reflected the events in Africa and Italy. As the war in Italy came to a close, the ruling nobility in Visigothic Spain divided behind two candidates for the throne. As was to be expected, Justinian moved quickly, ordering troops to be sent to take advantage of the situation. In the case of Spain, however, the Visigoths appear to have recognised their danger -after all, the events in Africa and Italy would be well known – and quickly reunited under one leader. The reconquest ground to a halt and a united Visigothic kingdom slowly forced the empire to retreat. In all of these cases, without the internal political divisions in the ruling elite the Byzantines would have been extremely hard pressed to achieve their goals.

It is commonly assumed that Justinian came to the throne with a master plan to regain the west. Recognising Byzantine weakness, he first negotiated a peace with the Sasanids before launching his western expeditions. This supposition suggests that Justinian had complete understanding of Byzantine political and military strengths and weaknesses. Yet the fact that he continued and widened the campaigns of expansion, even when war again broke out in the east, suggests that the claim is false. Such an enlargement of the original conflict would be unacceptable if Justinian accepted that he could not fight wars on more than two fronts. As a consequence, it can be suggested that there was no ‘grand plan’ to annex the lost western provinces.

The ‘reconquest’ was a series of unconnected wars, each following on from the previous conflict in a series of natural progressions. In all of these Justinian was hoping for a quick end to the war, as had happened in Africa. This explains his willingness to expand in the west whilst still fighting in the east: the western wars would – hopefully – quickly be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, releasing the troops needed to fight the Sasanids.

Belisarius

For the present purpose, the main question concerning the ‘reconquest’ is the role and ability of its major player, Belisarius. He has always received an excellent report from historians, who have based their opinion on the early sections of Procopius and especially the battles of Dara, Ad Decimum and Tricamerum. On the whole, the earlier losses in the east and the battle of Rome have been ignored or marginalised in order to promote Belisarius’ abilities as a general. In order to determine whether Belisarius deserves his reputation as one of the finest generals of the Byzantine period, we will analyse his career chronologically to gain a clear idea of his abilities.

In his early battles in the east Belisarius was on the winning side once, at the Battle of Dara. The battle was a resounding success and appears to have been the result of Belisarius having a clear strategy in place, and of his predicting the Persian moves and having the tactical flexibility necessary to overcome them. The battle should be classed as one of the outstanding single military victories in warfare. Yet the winning of individual battles, however brilliantly, is not necessarily the most important attribute of a general; it is winning the whole conflict that counts. Belisarius did not achieve this goal.

The first battle in the east is unnamed by our sources, yet it is clear that Belisarius and Sittas were soundly defeated. The Battle of Tanurin which followed was the first described in which Belisarius played a leading part. In this battle the Byzantines were on the offensive and the Sasanids had the time to prepare defensive positions, luring the Byzantines into attacking across pre-dug trenches.

In the third battle, at Mindouos, Belisarius was again defeated but again we are not given any details of the engagment. However, the fact that he was now promoted suggests that, for whatever reason, the defeat was not seen to be as a result of his abilities. The most likely reason is that Belisarius was a junior partner in the early battles, and that the main blame for defeat rested with his superiors and not him. Conversely, in the only battles where he was sole commander he won an outstanding victory at Dara, whilst he was cleared of blame for the defeat at Callinicum by the enquiry that followed. As a consequence, the defeat at Callinicum was relegated to the background whilst the victory at Dara was promoted as an outstanding military action – possibly for internal and external political reasons.

In one way, however, these defeats do seem to have affected Belisarius. From this point onwards he remained essentially a cautious commander, looking after the well-being of his men and taking care with their lives. Although this may also have been necessary as a result of his being given very few troops to work with, it appears that the defeats in the east, which were on the whole offensive battles, permanently affected his conduct: he would prefer to fight defensive battles. The fact that he lost several major battles where he was on the offensive – such as Tanurin, Callinicum, and Rome – but was extremely effective defensively – such as at the siege of Rome – supports the conclusion.

The campaign in the east was won by a mixture of diplomacy and the threat of war, coupled with the fact that both parties wanted peace -Justinian to deal with the Vandals and Khusrow to begin his overhaul of the Sasanid administrative and military organisation. Although a second victory after Dara could have ended the war sooner, Belisarius’ defeat at Callinicum ensured that the war would grind on for longer than was absolutely necessary.

In Africa, Belisarius appears to have had little control over the two battles in which the Byzantines were victorious. At the Battle of Ad Decimum, even Procopius allows that he did not want to fight and was actually attempting to evaluate the strength of the Vandals when he was caught in an encounter battle. Although luck certainly played a large part in the battle, the calmness he displayed in the face of the unexpected and the speed of his decisions resulted in a substantial victory, achieved by what must be described as superior generalship.

The Battle of Tricamerum was a different affair. A close reading of Procopius suggests that Belisarius had little influence on the deployment of the troops, with John the Armenian deploying the troops before the battle. There are two possible ways of interpreting the events which followed: either John remained in control of the battle, since Belisarius had arrived late and did not have all of the necessary information to hand, or Belisarius arrived and took control. As was suggested in Chapter 6, the likelihood is that John deployed, either with a plan for the upcoming battle in mind or in a standard array due to being taken by surprise. In this scenario, John remained in overall control of the elite troops in the centre whilst Belisarius took command of the rest of the army.

However, whichever of these cases is the truth has little bearing on an assessment of Belisarius as a commander. If he took full control of the army, he should be credited with gaining an outstanding victory. The overall plan for the battle and the timing of the attacks in the centre, along with that of the general assault which caused a complete Vandal collapse, shows a commander in top form. If, on the other hand, he allowed John to remain in control and only commanded either one or both wings, he again deserves a lot of credit. Although the credit for the overall plan should go to John, Belisarius deserves praise on two counts. One is for his common sense in recognising that John had a better picture of the situation and for allowing him to retain command. This shows that Belisarius knew his limitations and trusted in the ability of his senior officers. The second follows from the fact that John now became embroiled in the conflict in the centre and may have been unable to give commands in the heat of battle. Belisarius is probably the commander whose judgement and timing allowed the all-out attack across the front to succeed in routing the Vandals. Whichever option is chosen, Belisarius gains a lot of credit for his actions in the battle.

If Belisarius gains credit from his conduct in Africa, his strategy in Italy up to the Battle of Rome deserves a higher level of commendation. The continued policy of controlling his troops and protecting the natives paid dividends, with the whole of the south surrendering without resistance. Furthermore, when Ebrimuth, the Gothic commander in the south, submitted – whether from a desire to retire in comfort in the east, or from a dislike of Theodahad, or from the assumption that Belisarius was certain to win – he was treated with courtesy, and this in all likelihood enticed the others to yield.

Yet it is after the successful capture of Naples that Belisarius earned the approval of the Italian populace as a whole. The refusal of the citizens to surrender meant that, by the accepted rules of war, once the city was captured the victors had the right to take anyone or anything they desired. Belisarius’ order to return all of the captives to the city was a gesture that would result in the surrender of both Rome and Milan, since they now knew that they could expect fair and generous treatment from Belisarius. After assuming control of Rome, Belisarius’ deportment and confidence, combined with his tactical and strategic insights, ensured that the city would be safe from Gothic attack. This is the sign of a general at the top of his game.

Shortly afterwards, however, he was to suffer his only defeat in Italy at the Battle of Rome. Although Procopius lays the blame with the troops, since they forced Belisarius to fight against his will, the truth of the claim is open to question. The excuse had already been used at the Battle of Callinicum, where Belisarius had also lost. It is possible that at Callinicum the claim was vindicated, since Belisarius was cleared by the inquest into the defeat. At Rome, the declaration that Belisarius had again reluctantly agreed to fight at the insistence of his men is more open to question. At Callinicum Belisarius was still a relatively unknown general who may indeed have succumbed to pressure: by the time of the Battle of Rome Belisarius had established a reputation as a general and, since he had compelled his men to return the captives at Naples, it is clear that he had control of the troops. He should have been able to refuse any request by the troops that they fight a battle. It is more likely that Belisarius, a master of the ruse and defensive strategy, became over confident and fought the battle on his own initiative. After the defeat, and facing censure, the blame was laid on the troops – calling to mind the Battle of Callinicum -and the excuse accepted. Yet even if the excuse is accepted at face value, it does not show Belisarius in a favourable light. Although Procopius claims that Belisarius recognised the dangers of battle, the general who could so dominate his men that they would return captives does not deserve credit if he then yields to their demands to fight. Whatever the cause of Belisarius leaving the city to fight, he gains no credit for losing the battle.

Although not a major defeat, mainly thanks to the actions of Principius, Tarmatus and their troops, the Battle of Rome taught Belisarius a valuable lesson: the Gothic troops, despite numerous defeats in small-scale engagements, remained effective in the field of battle. He would not underestimate their valour again. For the remainder of his time in Italy he relied upon the use of deception, artifice and siege in his attempt to defeat the Goths. The fact that in this he almost entirely succeeded is the sign of a great general.

After his recall and return to the east he continued to rely upon strategy and hoax in order to defeat the Sasanids. In this he succeeded on the whole, forcing the Sasanids to retire from strong positions and slowly attempting to regain the initiative from Khusrow. Yet his refusal to fight a major battle may be due to a different cause: it is possible – though not provable – that the defeat at Rome affected his confidence and resulted in a desire to avoid risking all in a single engagement. On the whole, however, his conduct in the east should be seen as a continuation of his use of deception, artifice and siege in order to win the war -or at least prevent the Sasanids from gaining the upper hand. On the whole, he succeeded in his aims.

Upon his return to Italy, he continued to avoid battle, although at this late stage whether he wanted to fight or not was not an issue: he was never to be given the resources needed to face the Goths in an open battle. Yet his continuous movement and his reputation appears to have to some degree restricted the offensive desires of Totila, who only unleashed his full military abilities after Belisarius’ final recall, quickly reducing the Byzantine control to only a few towns and re-establishing a presence in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica.

The final battle against the Huns allows us to establish a firm opinion of Belisarius’ residual abilities at an older age. His bold decision to split his troops, despite being outnumbered, allowed him to attack the Huns from three different directions, resulting in a collapse in their morale and eventual defeat. Even with hindsight it is hard to imagine how else he might have won the battle against such odds. Belisarius’ ability to foresee the Huns’ response demonstrates that he retained his military flair into old age.