Read Blowing Up Russia Online
Authors: Alexander Litvinenko
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Terrorism, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Violence in Society, #True Crime, #Espionage, #Murder
N.S. Chekulin Former acting director of the Scientific Research Institute Roskonversvzryvtsentr of the Ministry of Education of Russia
ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTS OF THE SOURCE
OF THE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS USED TO BLOW UP
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN 1999
The initial version: hexogene On September 10, 1999 the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets published material about the explosion on Guryanov Street, in which it said: Yesterday an anonymous caller phoned the Interfax office and declared, speaking with a Caucasian accent: What happened in Moscow and Buinaksk is our response to the bombing of the peaceful villages of Chechnya and Dagestan . That was how the Chechen-Dagestani version of events first came to light.
At about the same time the mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov was announcing from the television screen that Chechens were undoubtedly involved in the bombings.
In a television interview after the explosion on Guryanov Street the Director of the FSB Patrushev stated that an analysis of the explosive material used had discovered traces of hexogene and TNT.
On September 10, 1999 the Moscow and Moscow Region department of the FSB announced that the collapse of the entranceways of the house on Guryanov Street occurred as a result of the detonation of a high-explosive mixture with a mass of about 350 kg. the explosive device was situated at street floor level. Chemical investigations of items removed from the scene discovered on their surfaces traces of& hexogene and
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TNT.
On September 15, 1999 the head of the Ministry of the Interior s Central Office for Combating Organized Crime Kozlov confirmed that at Guryanov Street it was not a home made pyrotechnical mixture, but industrial explosive that was used.
On September 23, 1999 the head of the engineering and technical section of the Ryazan Region UVD (Office of the Interior), senior lieutenant Yury Tkachenko, carried out an express analysis of the substance discovered in the house on Novosyolov Street in Ryazan. According to Tkachenko s report the gas analyzer indicated fumes of a hexogene type explosive. Then this expert confirmed this conclusion repeatedly in video and audio recordings.
TNT.
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On September 23, 1999 the MVD press center issued an official statement concerning what was found in Ryazan on Novosyolov Street: In investigating the substance in question the presence of hexogene fumes was discovered. At the same time the MVD emphasized that an explosive device was disarmed.
The second version: an identical explosive On March 16, 2000 the first deputy head of the operational investigations office of Department T of the FSB, General Shagako, announced at a press conference: The constituents of the explosive substances which were discovered in the basement premise on Borisovskye Prudy Street in Moscow, and also the constituents of the explosive substances which were discovered in the town of Buinaksk on September 4, 1999 in a ZIL-130 automobile, unexploded, they are identical, i.e. the composition of these substances includes ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, in particular cases there are admixtures of hexogene and in particular cases there are admixtures of TNT.
Then Shagako stated that two months earlier in the Urus-Martanov region of Chechnya the FSB had discovered a center for training demolition specialists, and 5 tons of ammonium nitrate had been discovered on the territory of the camp. Also found here were activating mechanisms similar to the mechanisms that were used in the explosions that I have already listed& the activating mechanisms discovered in the ZIl-130 automobile, in the town of Buinaksk and also the activating mechanisms discovered in the basement premises in the city of Moscow on Borisovskye Prudy Street, in the course of a criminal investigation were proved to be identical.
Shagako went on to list identical items: Casio watches, single-colored wires and other things that were found in Khattab s camps.
At the same press conference FSB General Zdanovich asked a rhetorical question: Have there been any cases of theft of this explosive from the state factories where it is produced using specific technologies? And he answered himself: I can say immediately that there have not, at least our investigation is not in possession of any such data.
The third version: hexogene-free
On March 20, 2000 during the recording of an NTV program with the author Nikolaev, FSB General Zdanovich stated that hexogene was not used either in Ryazan or in the other cities in Russia in the bombings of apartment blocks. The program was broadcast on March 24.
On December 22, 2000 Moskovsky Komsomolets published an interview by the correspondent Alexander Khinstein of the head of the operational investigations office, the deputy head of the FSB s Department T, General Mironov. In the interview a new FSB version of the explosions that had taken place was given.
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Khinstein s question: We have touched on the subject of the Moscow explosions. Is it possible to say with certainty how these terrorist acts were prepared?
Answer: Yes, all the elements have already been put in place. Some of the perpetrators of the crime have been arrested. The main ones are being sought. We know in addition how this explosive was produced, who was issuing the orders& It is interesting to note that even before the explosions in Moscow and in Buinaksk the same technology had been developed in other places, for instance in Tashkent. The mixture of components there was exactly the same. We believe that a similar explosive has been used to commit terrorist acts in Africa.
General Mironov confirmed that in the terrorist acts in Moscow and Volgodonsk Casio watches were used.
Khinstein s question: Shortly after the explosions quite a few different accounts appeared of how exactly the hexogene was delivered to Moscow?
Answer: Today we ve worked out the entire route& In Chechnya there were two sabotage training camps: foreign instructors trained fighters in Serzhen-Yurt and in Urus- Martan. At these bases there was a special installation for producing the explosive mixture in large quantities. Its components included ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder and sugar. About fifteen tons were prepared: they used five and ten were confiscated by us. As far as we know, it was made by fighters of Uzbek Nationality. The explosive was specially transferred to Kislovodsk and based there, and from there in a heavy-duty van they delivered it to Moscow together with sacks of sugar. They distributed it round several addresses. Two of these addresses everybody knows:
Kashirskoe Chausse and Guryanov Street&
On May 14, 2002 the full text was published of an answer sent from the General Public Prosecutor s Office, signed by Kolmogorov, in response to an inquiry by State Duma deputy Kulikov concerning the results of the investigation into the criminal cases initiated on the basis of the explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk, and also concerning the FSB exercises that took place in Ryazan in the fall of 1999. Kolmogorov signed a statement from his subordinates, which stated: As a result of a complex of investigative actions and operational investigative measures exhaustive proof was obtained that the acts of terrorism being investigated were committed by an organized criminal group consisting of illegal Chechen armed formations under the leadership of A. Sh. Gochiyaev and which also included Yu. I.
Krymshamkhalov, T.A. Batchaev, A.O. Dekkushev, D.V. Saitakov, Kh. M. Abaev and a number of other individuals.
Not one of the individuals named is a Chechen by nationality.
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The General Public Prosecutor s Office does not adduce any information concerning the name of the explosive substances used, their origin and the means of their delivery.
Against this background the position of the General Public Prosecutor s Office regarding the verification of the events of the so-called Ryazan exercises is highly indicative.
Kolmogorov can think of nothing better than to give a detailed description of an explosive substance that was not found in Ryazan. His letter states in particular: The expert explosives analysis carried out in connection with the case has established that the sacks contained saccharose-disaccharide based on glucopyranose and fructoranose. Traces of high-explosive substances (TNT, hexogene, octogen, TEN, nitroglycerine, tetryl and picric acid were not discovered in the substance under investigation.
That is to say, seven possible names of explosive substances - no more and no less. The names given do not include ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder or dust, sugar,
industrial oil or plastic explosive.
The letter from the General Public Prosecutor s Office also contains one other piece of testimony: The police detachment that arrived in response to the call discovered in the basement of the house indicated three sacks containing a white, friable substance and a device consisting of three Crown electric batteries, an electronic watch and a 12-calibre hunting cartridge, resembling an electro-detonator& In view of the fact that the objects found bore a resemblance to the home-made explosive devices used in the explosions in Moscow, it was decided to evacuate the residents of the building, and the FSB Department of Russia s investigative section for the Ryazan Region initiated a criminal case on the basis of indications of a crime as stipulated in articles 30 part 3 and 205 part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (attempted terrorism).
The fourth version: sugar
On September 9, 2002, on the third anniversary of the explosion on Guryanov Street Rossiyskaya Gazeta published a new interview with Ivan Mironov, still in the same post.
Answering the very first question the general said that he did not see any need to engage in polemics with Boris Berezovsky, since In two years the investigation has gathered enough incontrovertible evidence of the guilt of concrete individuals to construct a single precise and logically motivated version of the Moscow terrorist acts. According to Mironov s version the main organizer and executor of the explosions was the Karachaevan Achemez Gochiyaev.
Mironov s answer concerning the motives for the crimes in Moscow and Volgodonsk is interesting. The general answers: Khattab was pursuing the goal of creating a second front . It was planned to use general terror to draw the peoples of the entire Northern Caucasus into the military action, to set, say the Ingushetians and the Ossetians against each other and totally intimidate Russia so that Russians would not feel safe anywhere.
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At this point we should revert to Mironov s answers to a similar question in December 2002. Then he highlighted the version of vengeance by the Karachaevans for the death of their fellow-fighters who had invaded the territory of Dagestan. The second point is purely political. The fighters wanted to demonstrate their ferocity and decisiveness, to punish absolutely innocent people for the start of military action.
Mironov s answers to questions about the composition of the explosive mixture used are extremely important. He said: this composition is used in geological work. We know the proportions of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder and ordinary industrial oil, which is added as a binding agent. In addition they added dry TNT and as an explosion initiator they used plastic explosive to heat up the main mass.
The general dwelt in particular on the role played by sugar. At first we thought that it was just being used for camouflage, in order to conceal the delivery. But it turned out to be an active component that is totally involved in the explosion. When it does, a great deal of heat is developed and a large amount of oxygen is burned. An airless space is created at the site of the explosion and a high temperature, which also makes it impossible for anything living to survive.
To the question of why it had been so difficult to determine the composition of the mixture, the general replied: When the aluminum powder is triggered no visible traces are left at the site of the explosion.
Then came the question: If there are no traces, how did the FSB explosives specialists determine the composition of the mixture?
The general answered: In Chechnya in the hiding places that we discovered we gradually began finding detailed instructions on bombs and explosives work, mostly in Arabic. He said that the explosion technology was developed by Abu Umar, who was killed in the course of the special operation, but in Kurchalo we found his workshop, where they made various mechanisms for explosive devices. According to Mironov the guerrilla fighters had organized their explosives work on the professional level, adapting themselves to conditions in the field. The way they discovered to produce an explosive substance is relative simple in its preparation because it is put together from substances which can almost be found in the kitchen.
On December 10, 2002 the press service of the Rostov Region office of the FSB announced the solution of the terrorist act in Volgodonsk, remarking that the investigative agencies have carried out explosives, criminalistic, biological and chemical analyses. It has been established that the power of the explosive device was equal to about two tons of TNT. No information was given concerning the explosive substances used.
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WHAT HEXOGENE IS AND WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO BLOW UP
THE APARTMENT BLOCKS
WHAT HEXOGENE IS AND WHAT COULD HAVE ...
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Hexogene is a highly powerful explosive substance. Its chemical composition includes the following elements: carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen. In the specialist literature it is referred to as cyclotrimethylentrinitroamine.
Hexogene is a product of the nitriding of urotropin. The raw materials for making hexogene are urotropin, which is also used for medical purposes, for instance kidney treatment, and nitric acid.
Hexogene is a white crystalline powder with a bulk density of about 1.1 g/cm3. Its compressibility and density are increased by the addition of a deterrent: paraffin or ceresin wax.
Hexogene is highly sensitive to mechanical action, in other words it is a highly dangerous explosive. For instance, hexogene is twenty times more sensitive than TNT and its destructive capacity is also significantly greater.
Hexogene is toxic, when working with it personal protective clothing is used to prevent the powder coming into contact with the skin and mucous membranes, or entering the lungs and digestive tract.
In military ammunition the term hexogene is used to mean deterred hexogene in complete products, i.e. hexogene slabs, which are designated as A-iX-1 or deterred hexogene mixed with TNT and other explosive substances. In this case the products are designated as A-IX-2 or in some other similar manner. These items of ammunition include high-explosive fragmentation shells such as NURS GRAD, S-13 and other classes of rockets and torpedoes.