No Lack of Courage (25 page)

18
.  The last Canadian material assets were moved and shipped to Kandahar on 29 November 2005, and Camp Julien, the Canadian base in Kabul, was officially handed over to the Afghan Ministry of Defence.

19
.  On 17 May 2006, Parliament voted to extend the Canadian military mission in Kandahar Province, as well as the work of the PRT, until February 2009.

20
.  
Managing Turmoil: The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change
, an Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, October 2006, 150. See also Michelle Parker, “Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangarhar, Afghanistan in 2006,”
Case Studies in National Security Transformation
, Number 10, nd, 2.

21
.  
Managing Turmoil: The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change
, an Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, October 2006, 149. The PRT in Kandahar focused on three major areas: good governance, security sector reform (including providing training and equipment to Afghan police), and reconstruction and development.

22
.  General Rick Hillier, “Exporting Stability,”
Vanguard
, February/March 2006, 30.

23
.  Daniel Leblanc, “JTF 2 to Hunt Al-Qaeda,”
Globe and Mail
, 15 July 2005, A1. The attacks that prompted Hillier's comments occurred on 7 July 2005 (7/7) when a number of British Muslims carried out a series of coordinated suicide-bomb attacks on London's public transportation system during the morning rush hour. They killed 52 people and injured approximately 700. At 0850 hours, three detonations were triggered within 50 seconds of each other on three London subway trains. A fourth explosion occurred nearly an hour later, at 0947 hours on a bus in Tavistock Square. The suicide bombings represented the largest and deadliest terrorist attack on London's transit system. The attacks were allegedly motivated by Britain's involvement in the Iraq War and Afghanistan.

24
.  Rory Leishman, “Fighting Taliban Protects Canada,”
London Free Press
, 2 January 2007, A6.

25
.  Paul Koring, “More Troops at Risk, General Warns. Ottawa says CF-18s ready for Afghanistan,”
Globe and Mail
. The MND, Gordon O'Connor, also asserted, “Our CF are in Afghanistan because it is in our national interest because we have the responsibility to take a leadership role in world affairs and because Afghans need us and
want us to help them.”
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan
, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, June 2007, 40.

26
.  NATO took control of ISAF in 2003. Since then it has expanded: to the north in 2004 (Stage I), to the west in 2005 (Stage II), and the plan to move to the south (Stage III) transpired in 2005/2006.

27
.  
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan
, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, June 2007, 11.

28
.  
Ibid
., 6. While the intent to assist others was certainly there, we should not fool ourselves into believing the decision to deploy forces in a combat role in Afghanistan was completely altruistic. In keeping with the “supporting allies” theme, the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan has positively affected our relationship with the U.S. It is no coincidence that many of the issues that remained insoluble (e.g., mad cow disease, NAFTA, softwood lumber, and border issues) quietly disappeared. As one senior Canadian general officer stated, “It [combat role in Afghanistan] has resulted in a ‘sea change in the [U.S./Canadian] relationship.'”

29
.  Sally Armstrong, “Honour Roll 2006: Envoy Extraordinary,”
Maclean's
, 27 June 2006,
www.macleans.ca/culture/people/article.isp?content_20060701_129993_12993
, accessed 18 July 2006.

30
.  Canadian High Commission, “Cause for Celebration on ‘Independence Day,'”
Canada Focus
, 21 September 2007, 1.

31
.  “Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan,” DND Backgrounder, 15 May 2007. The Canadian efforts were in support of the internationally supported Afghanistan Compact, which was developed in London, 31 January to 1 February 2006. The Compact commits international community (more than 60 countries and international organizations) along with the GoA and the UN to achieve progress in three critical and interrelated areas of activity for the period 2006–11: security; governance, including rule of law, human rights, and tackling corruption; and economic and social development. The Afghan Compact aimed to: triple the Afghan army to 70,000 troops; disband all illegal militias by 2007; reduce by 70 percent the amount of land made unusable by land mines by 2010; reduce the number of people living on less than $1 a day by
3 percent per year and the proportion of those who are hungry by 5 percent per year; create functioning justice institutions in every province by end of 2010, including prisons with separate facilities for women and juveniles; upgrade the country's main ring road, central to government plans to revive Afghanistan's historic role as a land bridge between Central and South Asia; bring electricity to 65 percent of urban homes and 25 percent of rural homes by the end of 2010; enroll 60 percent of girls and 75 percent of boys in primary school by 2010.

32
.  Canada,
How Are We doing in Afghanistan?
, 1. The Standing Committee set the following benchmarks for success:

See Canada,
Managing Turmoil
, 34. Retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, the first commander of United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo, summarized the aim of the mission as, “to leave Afghanistan as quickly as humanly possible—having turned the security of the country over to competent Afghan military and police forces controlled in their efforts by a democratically elected national government.”

33
.  Hillier, “Exporting Stability,” 30.

34
.  The 1 PPCLI Battle Group (BG) consisted of 1 PPCLI, a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) troop, an HSS company, a forward support group (FSG), and the Kandahar Provincial
Reconstruction team (PRT). Hope stated that he chose the name Orion to give everyone a common identifier. “I chose Orion from the constellation—representing the mythical Greek hunter of mountain beasts—that I knew blessed the Afghan skies, so that our soldiers might look up and seeing it, feel part of a larger entity, enduring and meaningful.” Ian Hope, “Reflections on Afghanistan: Commanding Task Force Orion,” in B. Horn, ed.,
In Harm's Way. The Buck Stops Here: Senior Officers on Operations
(Kingston: CDA Press, 2007), 212. See also Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope,
Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan
(Kingston: CDA Press, 2008).

35
.  “1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (Task Force Orion)—Operational Summary,” 12 August 2006; and Ian Hope, “Reflections on Afghanistan: Commanding Task Force Orion,” in B. Horn, ed.,
In Harm's Way. The Buck Stops Here: Senior Officers on Operations
(Kingston: CDA Press, 2007), 212. Hope stated, “Our tasks were multifarious, divided into three broad categories: governance, security and reconstruction.”

Chapter Two

1
.    Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope,
Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan
(Kingston: CDA Press, 2008), 153.

2
.    Quoted in Chris Wattie,
Contact Charlie
:
The Canadian Army, The Taliban and the Battle that Saved Afghanistan
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2008), 53.

3
.    On 31 July 2006, the Task Force reverted to operational command of ISAF.

4
.    The change in leadership was quickly apparent to Hope. He explained, “Under Operation Enduring Freedom there was a prevailing philosophy of ‘mission command' with echelons of headquarters pushing resources to the commander in the fight, and asking him what more he needed. There was never second-guessing or micro-management
of the battalion's battles. Under ISAF the philosophy was reverting to one of tight control of everything by general officers many hundreds of kilometers away.” Hope,
Dancing with the Dushman
, 15.

5
.    Despite all of the sensors and HUMINT, Hope noted that he “never had more than 20 percent of the information. Most often not even that much.” Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, presentation—Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, 25 May 2007.

6
.    Ian Hope, “Reflections on Afghanistan: Commanding Task Force Orion,” in B. Horn, ed.,
In Harm's Way. The Buck Stops Here: Senior Officers on Operations
(Kingston: CDA Press, 2007), 216–17.

7
.    Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, presentation—Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, 25 May 2007.

8
.    Captain Kevin Barry, TF Orion QRF Commander, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

9
.    Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, Operations Officer MNB HQ, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

10
.  “Biggest Cdn/U.K./U.S. Operation Since Korea,”
The Canadian Army News
, 28 August 2006,
www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=1219
, accessed 14 June 2010.

11
.  
Ibid
.

12
.  The Senlis Council,
Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep. A Case Study of the Military Coalitions in Southern Afghanistan
, London, June 2006, v.

13
.  
Ibid
., xi.

14
.  
Ibid
., 31.

15
.  “Brigade and Battle Group Operations—Kandahar and Helmand—July 2006,” CO's PPT presentation. ANSF consisted of the ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP) and border forces.

16
.  Quoted in Wattie, 209.

17
.  Captain Andrew Charchuk, “‘Contact C' A Forward Observation Officer with Task Force Orion,”
The Canadian Army Journal
, Vol 10.2, Summer 2007, 25. The RPG 29 is a lightweight (11.5 kg) and concealable weapon. It has a range of 800 metres and can penetrate more than 750 millimetres of armour, 1.5 metres of reinforced concrete or brick, and 3.7 metres of logs and earth.

18
.  Christie Blatchford,
Fifteen Days: Stories of Bravery, Friendship, Life and Death from Inside the New Canadian Army
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2007), 13.

19
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, Operations Officer MNB HQ, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

20
.  Hope,
Dancing with the Dushman
, 16.

21
.  Schreiber, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

22
.  
Ibid
.

23
.  Hope,
Dancing with the Dushman
, 5.

24
.  Master-Corporal Matthew Parsons, interview with author, 24 January 2007.

25
.  Quoted in Wattie, 214.

26
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, Presentation—Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, 25 May 2007.

27
.  Terry Pedwell, “Taliban ‘Were Too Organized,'”
Canadian Press
, 4 August 2006.

28
.  Sergeant Patrick Towers, interview with author, 24 January 2007.

29
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author 21 October 2006. The interview has been captured in full in Brigadier-General David Fraser, “No Small Victory: Insights of the Commander of Combined Task Force Aegis on Operation Medusa,” in Colonel Bernd Horn, ed.,
In Harm's Ways. The Buck Stops Here: Operational Perspectives of Senior Military Leaders
(Kingston: CDA Press, 2007), 243–56.

30
.  Confidential Interview, 10 July 2008.

31
.  Hope,
Dancing with the Dushman
, 9.

32
.  
Ibid
., 13.

33
.  
Ibid
., 6.

34
.  
Ibid
., 13.

35
.  
Ibid
., 15–16.

36
.  Terry Pedwell, “Deadly Day for Troops,”
Kingston Whig-Standard
, 4 August 2006, 9.

37
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author 21 October 2006. During their tour 1 PPCLI BG conducted: 128 Shuras/leadership engagements; 29 operations; 23 combined operations with ANSF; 646 total patrols; and 291 joint patrols with ANSF. They
clocked 1,700,000 kilometres of driving. They also participated in 15 intensive firefights and 100+ troops in contact (TICs). They were the target of 67 Small arms attacks; 59 RPG attacks; 33 rocket attacks; 16 mortar attacks; and 25 IED attacks. They captured 39 detainees, inflicted four confirmed and 181 estimated enemy wounded in action (WIA), and 26 confirmed and 213 estimated enemy killed in action (KIA). They themselves suffered 10 percent casualties—19 KIA and 76 WIA. “1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (Task Force Orion)—Operational Summary,” 12 August 2006.