NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century (7 page)

Agriculture has been a vexed issue for India. The domestic political implications of agriculture sector liberalization are uncertain. The external dimension of agriculture will be shaped by two contexts. Food security is going to be on the agenda of several major economies, as fears of food price inflation spread. It is in India’s interest that the global regime on food trade be fair and open. Global cooperation on food security will be of fundamental importance. Second, the gradual elimination of agriculture subsidies in the United States and Europe may bring agriculture liberalization back on the agenda. Agriculture liberalization is a difficult area for us. It has
complex social and economic consequences. But India needs to carefully weigh its options, and to have a clear long-term strategy in this area—one that is not merely susceptible to short-term political pressures. Here too, we need to evolve greater agreement on long-term management of the agriculture sector, leading to a national consensus on its strategic importance, particularly in an era of uncertainty in global food commodities markets.

Our international economic integration will require partners in the immediate neighbourhood. This will need a concerted push towards increasing mobility of goods, services, capital and labour needs vis-à-vis the countries of South Asia, East Africa, West Asia and South-East Asia: all of which are well positioned to dramatically expand their economic engagement with India. Within modest time horizons, it should be possible to enlarge measures of integration with these countries by ten times, on all four dimensions (goods, services, capital and labour).

All these areas will require institutional collaboration and redesign. Our government, political and business elites still tend to think of the international economy in terms of discrete issue areas of concern to each of them. That fragmented picture must be abandoned, in favour of one that views our international economic engagements as a unified and coherent project—embodying shared
interests and with clear linkages back into the domestic economy and electoral considerations. Can we leverage bargains from one sector to the other? Do we possess the institutional mechanisms to do so? There already exist many government institutions that should ideally address these questions (within the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, Reserve Bank of India, etc.). However, lateral communication between these institutions is too often blocked and insufficient. Appropriate intergovernmental communication must be enhanced, while avoiding bureaucratic creep: effective coordinating mechanisms between various actors would be a first step.

Second, there is a major shortage of systemic, continuous data collection activities which should provide the empirical basis for strategic decisions. Such activities need to be started immediately—perhaps with the help of India’s burgeoning knowledge-processing industry. In this vein, given rapid developments in information collection and processing technologies, there will need to be regular reassessment of what activities are best allocated to the public and private sectors respectively. Bureaucratically entrenched data and analysis systems are no longer adequate to our current and coming strategic requirements concerning the economy.

Third, the form of interaction between the public and private sector needs fundamental change. Generally speaking, the government and Indian businesses seem to have a fairly instrumental relationship, with each side conversing with the other only in times of crisis or need. What is needed is a sustained, collaborative dialogue, where trust can be built and both sides can develop realistic notions of what they can and cannot expect from the other. Such a relationship would greatly augment the strategic coordination possible between government and business, both internationally and domestically. Greater continuous communication on economic issues between government and the business community should in turn be transparent to the media, so that public opinion can be carried along in creating a national consensus on our strategic economic interests.

India must have a coherent vision of the global economy and its position within it, combined with a concrete set of actions for its interactions in various international institutions which are part of the global economic order. This includes not only the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, but also international standards organizations like the Basel agreements, accounting standards, G-20, etc. While it may not be necessary to take an aggressive stance in every
organization or institution, the scenario building and consideration of strategic options seem to be severely lacking (as is evidenced, for instance, by India’s role in such processes as appointments of IMF chiefs). In each of these international engagements, India needs to boost the intellectual capacity within the country which would identify India’s interests on an array of issues and help the government strategize mechanisms through which India’s interests can be pursued.

India’s engagement in the construction of an international order will be through a variety of instruments: participation in regional and global institutions and possible participation with groups of countries. The structures of competition in the global system will present India with a range of partnership choices. For a start, India will be sought after in great power competition. This presents a great historical opportunity for India. Traditionally India has been uneasy about formal alliances. But when national interest has required it, we have chosen closer relationships with particular powers. Yet this has been done while maintaining the core objectives of nonalignment: maintaining strategic autonomy; protecting core national interests; and, as far
as possible, maintaining India’s position as an object of great power agreement. These broad objectives remain valid. But they will have to be interpreted and pursued in a new context.

At no time since the emergence of a recognizable ‘world system’ has power been so diffused at the global level. India’s own position will need to be able to straddle many worlds, to connect across the various nodes of a more diffused global power system. In terms of constitutional vision, India is the most ‘Western’ and liberal among the non-Western powers. But we are rooted in Asia. As a poor and developing country, we also have an enormous global footprint. We have the potential to become a technological powerhouse, yet remain an informal economy. We are committed to democratic practices and are convinced that robust democracies are a surer guarantee of security in our neighbourhood and beyond. Yet we do not ‘promote’ democracy or see it as an ideological concept that serves as a polarizing axis in world politics. It follows that there are few ‘natural’ groupings—whether defined by political vision, economic profile and interests, or geopolitical security challenges—into which India can seamlessly fit. This diverse identity and the multiple interests that it underpins are actually our greatest strategic assets at the global level. For it means that India can be a unique
bridge between different worlds. Indeed, India’s bridging potential is one we must leverage and turn to our active benefit.

It is often said that India is well placed to improve its relations with all powers simultaneously, and this has also been our experience in the past decade. But such an approach also poses real challenges and demands skilful diplomacy. For example, in the foreseeable future India will need to calibrate its value to the United States as a countervailing power vis-à-vis China, with the need to avoid provoking China into open and damaging confrontation.

The partnership game, if played delicately, can yield real benefits. The prospect that India is a potential partner can give it leverage, both with the country courting it and with potential rivals. India must leverage to the full extent possible this dual diplomatic potential. Overall though, it is undoubtedly in India’s best interests to have a deep and wide engagement with as many powers as are willing to engage with it. This engagement is important for developing our own technology and military capabilities, as well as for spreading economic risks and for benefiting from flows of ideas and innovation distinctive to particular cultural traditions and contexts.

Such broad international engagement is also important
as a hedge against possible contingency. In the past, it has often been the force of events that has pushed India into closer relationships with other powers. Given that the future of Sino-US relations is uncertain, and that the likely evolution of China’s own foreign policy remains unclear, India must be prepared for a contingency where, for instance, threatening behaviour by one of the major powers could encourage or even force it to be closer to another. This is still a low-probability event, but cannot be ruled out entirely. India should engage with a variety of powers. But it has to recognize that its core security challenges are ones that it has to meet alone.

The United States of America remains the single most powerful country in the world. Its economic and military capabilities and its global reach remain unmatched. Its long-term prospects are better than that of most other advanced, industrialized economies, despite the current financial and economic crisis impacting the developed world. The United States has a favourable demography; it remains the knowledge capital of the world; its technological capabilities and culture of innovation continue to create value; and its entrepreneurial class
is one of the world’s most dynamic. For India, a closer partnership with the United States is both indispensable and desirable, in its journey towards achieving its own ambitious economic and social objectives.

India–US partnership is further strengthened by shared democratic values, intangible but important in sustaining India’s image in the United States as a friendly, benign and non-threatening power. A large and successful Indo-American community has served as a valuable bridge linking the two peoples together. There is a negative legacy of the past which continues to linger in the Indian consciousness. For most of the Cold War years, the United States bent its overwhelming power to frustrate Indian ambitions, ring it with ever-tightening technology denial regimes and remained unmindful of the collateral damage it inflicted on India due to its alliance with Pakistan and, later, with its quasi-alliance with China. However, the international environment which motivated negative US policies towards India has been transformed since the end of the Cold War and continues to witness rapid change. India should be mindful of history; its caution regarding the United States may be well founded. However, the legacy of history should not become a millstone round our necks, feeding into prejudice. This will prevent India from deriving advantage from
the changed international environment and leveraging a positive, forward-looking and friendly partnership with the United States in advancing our own strategic objectives.

If, in the past, a hostile United States could constrain India’s room for manoeuvre, today, in the unfolding international landscape, a strong India–US partnership, properly handled, can expand India’s strategic space. This has been evident in the strategic gain that India has achieved through the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. The current deterioration of US–Pakistan relations, with the prospect of US withdrawal from Afghanistan, further reinforces the convergence in India–US relations.

While US pre-eminence is likely to remain undiminished for the foreseeable future, its relative power and influence have and will continue to decline due to the rise of several other powers. At the upper tier, China and India will continue to expand as will Brazil. Russia and Japan may witness further relative decline in the global pecking order, while Europe will undergo relative decline more slowly. Middle-rung powers like South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran and South Africa will gain in power and influence. Over the horizon, Africa and Latin America seem likely to emerge as the economic powerhouses of the future.

This rise of the Rest has inevitably led to the diffusion of political and economic power, though in a somewhat asymmetric manner. The US alliance system is weakening. Its closest allies in Europe and Japan are no longer the strong and predictable pillars of US global strategy as they were in the past. The search for a viable strategy has led the United States to build or renew partnerships with countries like India, Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa. However, these relationships are being pursued in a world very different from the Cold War era—when the Soviet ‘threat’ led some of these countries to seek US support and assurance of security. In contrast, the world’s rising powers see greater opportunity in playing the polycentric game. Instead of fixed and stable alliances there are ad hoc region- or issue-based coalitions. The United States, which has been used to dealing with allies or with adversaries, has been finding it difficult to adjust to more nuanced relationships with the rising powers. India–US relations display some of these contradictions.

China is America’s principal competitor, more in economic terms and less, for the time being, in military terms. In this context, India holds special attraction for the United States because, after China, it is the biggest among rising powers and has a complex, and often adversarial, relationship with China. Nevertheless, there
are two competing trends in the evolving US posture towards China. One seeks to reconcile the United States to the inevitability of Chinese ascendancy in the Asian theatre, and position it as an offshore balancer. This harks back to the role, in the nineteenth century, of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the European continent. The other trend of thinking seeks to contain China as a threat to US dominance, with the Asia-Pacific theatre being regarded as critical to maintaining US pre-eminence globally. US policy appears to oscillate between these two ends of the spectrum, currently being closer to the latter end of the spectrum. For India, Sino-US collusion is as much of a threat as is the prospect of their open confrontation. While the United States could, in certain circumstances, emerge as a likely ally, for the present, Indian interests may be better served by a strong and broad-based partnership with the United States while managing the dynamic mix of competition and convergence in India–China relations.