Read Some Day the Sun Will Shine and Have Not Will Be No More Online
Authors: Brian Peckford
Mr. Trudeau's resignation led to a Liberal Convention on June 16, 1984, at
which John Turner was elected leader and automatically prime minister. In July,
Turner moved swiftly, calling an election for September. The Liberal fortunes
started to rise in the polls, and a Progressive Conservative victory, probable
only a weeks before, now seemed very uncertain.
For once, luck was on our side. A secret deal between Trudeau and Turner saw a
flurry of appointments to the Senate and other
government
agencies and some questionable appointments by Turner himself, all reflecting
badly on the Liberals. In the public television debates during the campaign,
Mulroney exploited this Liberal largesse and cronyism, putting Turner on the
defensive and delivering a major blow to the Liberal fortunes. Mulroney's
now-famous line during the debate, “You had an option. You could have done
better,” referring to Turner and his position on the appointments, resonated
with the voters.
On election night Mulroney won a landslide victory of 211 seats in the 282-seat
House of Commons, the largest seat victory in Canada's history.
The period from the Mulroney victory on September, 1984, to February, 1985,
marks perhaps the five most important months in the history of our place. Talks
began again on the offshore. Our minister Marshall and the federal minister
Carney were at the negotiating table, taking instructions from their respective
first ministers and Cabinets.
Gone were the acrimony, intimidation, and paternalism of the federal
government. Commitments made were commitments met. Bill Marshall has commented
upon the negotiations with the new Energy minister, Pat Carney: “No longer were
we being treated as dupes in a game whose ultimate end was to force acceptance
of outright federal suzerainty over oil and gas off our shores. This time it was
for real!”
As a relevant aside, which I know will be hard for readers to believe, I
remember an incident when we were in a meeting with then Energy minister Jean
Chrétien over the big principle of us insisting on the establishment of an
Offshore Board (with equal federal and provincial representation, with an
independent chairperson with the full compliment of employees) and that it be
stationed in the province. Shockingly, the federal side mused about where the
children of the employees would go to school.
Marshall goes on to say:
In the Carney round of negotiations there was no divergence between the
word of the Federal
Energy Minister to me and what her
officials told our officials that they were instructed to translate into the
formal agreement. In fact, she saw to it that a trusted and highly competent
lieutenant, Harry Near, co-opted specifically for the purpose, sat in on the
meetings of the officials to assure that Federal Policy was being so
translated.
The Atlantic Accord was born!
Our last game changer, our last chance, did not go down to defeat by the
refusal of a federal government for constitutional change, as in the fishery; it
did not go down to judicial defeat as in Churchill Fallsâbut from such crushing
defeats rose an agreement unlike any in our history.
To quote a few of the main elements of the Atlantic Accord:
“To recognize the right of Newfoundland to be the principal beneficiary of
the oil and gas resources.”
“To provide that the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador can establish
and collect resource revenues as if those resources were on land, within the
Province.”
“To recognize the equality of both Governments in the management of the
resource.”
“The offices of the Board and its staff shall be located in
Newfoundland.”
“The two Governments recognize that there should not be a dollar for dollar
loss of equalization payments as a result of offshore revenues flowing to
the Province.”
“The Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
hereby establish an offshore
development fund [See Appendix
II]. The Fund will consist of a $300 million grant, cost shared 75% federal
and 25% provincial.”
And so for the first time in our history, we had negotiated an agreement that
gave to Newfoundland meaningful and effective levers to be a major player in one
of our own resourcesâthis time, oil and gas.
Sadly, it is forgotten now that Brian Mulroney could have easily taken a
tougher stand, armed as he was with a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision
clearly and categorically adjudicating in the federal government's favour. But
he did not.
NEVER A SECOND OR
a minute during our talks with the
prime minister or Minister Carney was advantage taken or pressure applied as a
result of that decision. Yet, here we were with de facto ownership, consistent
with national responsibilities, with the levers of ownership and jurisdiction.
February 11, 1985, was a great dayâthe signing of the Accord.
I remember sneaking away for an hour or so to be by myself, driving to Signal
Hill. I passed by the house at the bottom of the hill that Joe Peckford had
built, glanced down Temperance Street to where Joe had his own “rooms” now all
filled in and where the Terry Fox Memorial now stands.
Once on top of Signal Hill, I glanced out at the North Atlantic and my life
passed before me: my parents, my great teacher and confidant, Brose Paddock, the
basketball team in Springdale, the men who plied the waters of Green Bay,
Pistolet Bay, the French Shore, and the Labrador Coast with me, advised me, and
assisted me in “growing up,” who experienced with me the frustrations and
tribulations of people who were without, or troubled, or just plain looking for
help or guidanceâof making do, struggling with few resources and not whining and
complaining; the people of Green Bay who stood by me at all times, many sensing,
I think, the big picture, the greater good, and what I was seeking.
And my late new friend in La Poile would be a proud Tory
today.
Oil did not flow right away, of course; not until 1997 did the first oil flow
from the first development, Hibernia. But when it did, it began the real
movement to a better time.
Professor Richard Cullen, presently a law professor at Hong Kong University,
published a book in 1990 entitled
Federalism in Action: The Canadian and
Australian Offshore Disputes
, based on his doctoral thesis that he
completed at Osgoode Hall, York University. In it he said, “Through these two
Accords (Newfoundland's and then later Nova Scotia's, which was based on
Newfoundland's), these two Atlantic provinces have gained, in important ways,
more than they would have gained had they each won in court” (p. 193).
Later he continues: “The provinces have achieved the setting up of an offshore
policy-making and management board truly independent of federal control. And
they have also gained the same access to revenues from the adjacent continental
shelf that the award of provincial sovereign rights thereover would have
afforded them” (p. 193).
The last word concerning the Accord must go to Lin Jackson, in his book
Surviving Confederation
, who said of it:
But it is no piece of paper; it is a brand new Term of Union which confers
upon Newfoundland an unprecedented constitutional status with respect to the
use of resources off its shores. One need only glance at the history of this
area to realize that no other single factor contributed so persistently and
significantly to retarding Newfoundland's economic growth and its social
well-being over the centuries than precisely the fact that total
jurisdiction of the oceanic resources upon which the local people always
have depended, lay out of reach in the hands of others. The Atlantic Accord
is not “historic,” a “watershed,” “the most significant document since
Confederation” simply because Premier Brian
Peckford said it
was. It is so because for the first time in our 500-year history the people
and Government of Newfoundland have at long last been afforded a direct role
in determining the management, use, and benefit of the great traditional
resource of the banks of Newfoundland. (114)
On November 3, 2008, I received an email from Shelly Banfield, producer of the
St. John's CBC Radio Morning Show, which said in part:
Hi Mr. Peckford:
I don't know if you heard the news yet, but Newfoundland is officially off
equalization.
One day the sun will shine and have not will be no more!
THE HIBERNIA DEVELOPMENT WAS
thefirstdevelopment under the Atlantic Accord; we bargained hard for a
reasonable deal and I think we succeeded. So the Hibernia Statement of
Principles, July 18, 1988, was another great day marking as it did a real,
tangible result of the Accord. But given the time, there were many risks and oil
prices were a far cry from where they are today. The federal government had to
step in and assist. Once again Brian Mulroney came to the fore as well as
Michael Wilson, Marcel Masse, and John Crosbie, his Cabinet members. A
$1 billion contribution and a $1.6-billion guarantee were needed. Later the
project hit further trouble with the withdrawal of Gulf Canada and its 25% of
the project. The federal government stepped in again, taking 8.5% with the
remainder of the 25% taken up by Murphy Oil, Mobil, and Chevron.
Of course, such support from the federal government did not miss the eye of
those from away who saw this as some terrible mistake, while millions of federal
dollars were going into all sorts of projects for car plants in the country’s
heartland and into an area that had enjoyed for years the great advantages of an
Auto Pact with the United States, when at the same time we were forced to sell
unprocessed fish to the United States because we had no access like the central
Canadians had with their cars and car parts. The
Globe and Mail
led the
charge with its editorial on December 29, 1992. Its headline: “A Happy Ending to
Hibernia—and Soon.”
In the first paragraph it described the project as “the makings of a
grand tragedy,” and on a “historic scale” talked about the oil
being the most costly on earth.
I was no longer in government when this was written, but I responded the next
day with a letter to the editor:
Let me express my utter disgust with your editorial of
December 29 concerning the Hibernia Project. I find it strange indeed that
the marriage of the private and public sectors which built this country
finds so little favour with your paper. In advancing new frontiers, it has
been this partnership that has been so important. It is no different with
the first major offshore oil project development in this country. Strategic
investment by the public sectors has been a characteristic of this country
for decades. It is noteworthy that the strongest economies in the world
today are those that have mastered the simple idea of strategic co-operative
arrangements between the public and private sectors.
Newfoundland and Labrador is eager to work based on gifts that nature has
provided. Co-operation by all sectors is essential to make it happen.
Already, Ontario, Quebec, and western-Canadian companies have benefited from
the Hibernia project. We do not begrudge the billions of dollars that
provincial and federal governments have invested in Ontario and Quebec and
in energy and agricultural sectors in the west. In order for all regions to
grow and contribute, fairness demands the same support to ensure the natural
resources of Newfoundland and Labrador are developed for the benefit of all
of Canada.
In closing, I would like for your paper to provide me with the
data—economic and financial—that was used to reach the conclusions in your
editorial.
Needless to say, I did not receive a response to the letter and
I am unaware of whether the paper later ever made amends for its unfortunate
analysis and predictions. I have contacted the paper, and in getting them to
send me many of their later editorials, I cannot find where they have
acknowledged their monumental blunders regarding the price of oil and the cost
of Hibernia oil.
And they were not finished. They followed this up with editorials on January 6,
1993, and January 12, 1993. January 6 was headlined “If Hibernia Can’t Swim—Let
it Sink” and the January 12 one was headlined “Hibernia or
Uneconomics 101.”
What is most shocking, besides the colossal errors (mocked as they deliberately
inflated Hibernia to produce 700 million barrels— it will now produce
over 1 billion) and bad predictions (as if they somehow were blessed with the
only perfect crystal ball, saying oil prices will not keep up with inflation) is
the zeal with which they denigrated the project. It is as if deep in the heart
of the paper there was this gigantic fear that this just might succeed and we
can’t have that, so let’s kill it now.
Ironic, isn’t it, that this paper resides in Ontario, now a “have not”
province, and Newfoundland, largely because of Hibernia, is a “have” province?
Specifically, in the year 2011–12, Ontario will receive $2.2 billion in
equalization and Newfoundland will not receive any. In other words, because of
this great tragedy, Hibernia, Newfoundland
is now assisting
Ontario. This
“farce,” as they called it.
And I have just read a CBC report of July 5, 2011, that the federal government
in 2008 and 2009 bailed out the auto industry, largely in Ontario, to the tune
of—wait for it—$12 billion.
THE HIBERNIA STATEMENT OF
Principles, which we negotiated and
signed in 1988, stipulated that a gravity-based structure was to be the
production technology used and that it was to be built in Newfoundland (the
first in the Western Hemisphere) at the new Bull Arm site (constructed with
$95 million from the Offshore
Development Fund we had negotiated
in the Accord). Its design, as well as the design of the flare boom and subsea
lines, was to be done in the province, and the main support frame assembled and
outfitted at Bull Arm in the province.
We were beginning to realize our aim of having an industry, not just a project.
There were three provincial royalties: one before the project was paid for, one
after the project was paid for, and a super royalty if oil prices rose
significantly. Not bad compared with every other major resource deal ever done
in the history of the place.
On February 21, 1997, I was in St. John’s as a member of the board of CBC. I
was suddenly confronted by a host of people at the Hotel Newfoundland, all of
whom were invited there to witness the exciting, historic tow out of the
Hibernia platform. I was humiliated, since I had to inform the curious,
questioning people that no, I was not there to witness the tow out, because I
was not invited. I made little of it then, although it hurt for a while and, for
the record, I say it now.
IN
2010,
EFFORTS GOT
under way to
have a conference/ gathering to highlight and celebrate the 25th anniversary of
the Atlantic Accord. Memorial University was involved, as well as individuals
who were involved in the provincial government during the days when the Accord
was being negotiated, present representatives of the provincial government, and
the Newfoundland Ocean Industries Association.
Unfortunately, the format outlined for such a gathering did not find favour
with the provincial government representatives and NOIA. The idea was to have
the architects—that is, the politicians and public servants who actually did the
deal there—to talk about the events and issues leading up to this historic
document. Unbelievably, this did not happen, because of the lack of support from
the province and NOIA.
The event then went forward with just the university sponsoring it under a
Memorial Presents series whose “rules” precluded having someone from outside the
university to speak. I was told, “Memorial Presents is always a MUN presenter on
an issue of provincial
importance, along with a panellist or two
who provide some counterbalancing perspectives. Having someone of your status or
Bill’s as a panellist just did not make sense.” And having someone like us would
conflict “with their independence.” And it is not their place to have a
“celebration.”
Well, needless to say, when I heard this I flipped my top and wrote to Memorial
University.
I am having difficulty finding the words to respond to your comments.
Forget the “celebration” word. That is “different,” I suppose, because we
wouldn’t want the hallowed halls of academia to go berserk over one of the
greatest achievements of this land, especially in light of the railway, the
Hum on the Humber, and the Exploits River Central Newfoundland boondoggle,
the mining concessions to John Doyle, and the bankruptcy of Come By Chance
(a story for another time, and its resurrection, which, of course, could not
have the authors describe at some future university-inspired event), not to
mention Labrador Linerboard or the Upper Churchill—oh yes—the ground
fishery!
Parenthetically, the first blob of money out of the $300 million
development fund under the Accord was to Memorial University for the Geology
Building. How could they take it and remain independent?
“Oh, stop being so narrow, Brian, and not understanding the history and
importance of a free and independent institution of higher learning,” I can
hear in my ears. I expounded on that at great length in my speech at MUN
during the proceedings when I was awarded my honorary degree. Right on side,
I am.
So let’s not get hung up on the word celebration. Agreed! Not at the
university—never!
But to say that you cannot invite authors, signatories to
the Accord (1985), because that would somehow break or undermine the
“independence” of the university or your series is surely a stretch— no, not
a stretch; it is truly puzzling to me.
How can you say “it did not make sense” to have any of the signatories
there? How does one go about framing such rules? Does not the university
have authors of papers, poems, novels, fiction and non-fiction, music, and
visual art participate in the discussion of their creations?
Now, I do not mean to just have Bill Marshall or me and one or all of the
federal signatories; rather, having the signatories, or some of them,
introduce the topic and then others like Cullen and Locke or whoever follow
with a full and open discussion.
Okay, so given the restraints that you describe, let’s say this: it would
seem to me most reasonable to have Mr. Marshall (given there is no cost)
talk broadly about the principles of the Accord and to put it in
some 1985 context; then the others, academics from all perspectives to
present. I think this would be far more effective and realistic for those
who will see/ hear the proceedings. It would give an air of balance and
realism. Can one imagine that here is one of the authors right in your
midst, a former learned judge, citizen, and public figure extraordinaire,
and he is somehow viewed as ineligible from participating in what he helped
create, a creation which has seen this land for the first time in its
history become financially viable, one of only four “have” provinces in the
Canadian Confederation? This is special and unique!
This becomes most bizarre when one looks at the facts. Take Mr. Marshall,
for example. Here is a
man who distinguished himself as a
lawyer, then as a member of the legislature, and most particularly as
minister of Energy, and then having an exemplary period on the highest court
in the province, the Court of Appeal. He is known far and wide as highly
intelligent, learned, and fair, with integrity to burn. If anyone takes the
time to read any of his decisions, his fairness, integrity, and sense of
justice overwhelms. His formal politics ceased when he became a judge.
Please explain to me how the university’s policy of independence can
deliberately exclude such a man who was a critical part of the Accord’s
creation and final agreement from being asked to participate in a
discussion/gathering on the 25th anniversary of the Accord? Remember, it was
the province through Mr. Marshall at the table who insisted on principles
approved by me and Cabinet that saw this Accord move forward and then
accepted by Ottawa. And let’s not forget these principles had already been
rejected by an earlier federal government.
It seems to me that the university cannot, on the one hand, espouse open
and free expression and independence, if on the other hand it disallows some
people who happened to be in politics twenty years ago and just happened to
be the author of the subject of a public university–initiated discussion
from being a part of that very discussion. I suspect if I was to pursue this
through appropriate channels, a legitimate discrimination challenge could be
launched.
To put it another way, the university is a public institution. It is to
serve that public and provide information and analysis and a very wide,
diverse perspective to that public. It prides itself on openness and free
expression. It is contradictory to its mission
to establish
rules and policy for a public forum, which this 25th anniversary discussion
espouses, in a manner which discriminates against certain people from being
heard because of their political past (or is it something else of which I am
unaware?) and who are very relevant to that discussion, especially given
that these people were the authors of the subject being discussed and who no
longer are formal participants in the political process and have not been
for twenty years.
I am, of course, speaking here to the
university
and not to you as
an individual, but obviously this episode has hit a very sensitive
nerve.
Brian
If this is not one of the most amazing things you have ever heard, I don’t know
what could be.
The university wanted to talk about the pros and cons after the Agreement had
been in operation for twenty-five years, fine. But on the 25th anniversary of
that which made us a “have” province?