The essential writings of Machiavelli (6 page)

24.
Darius I (550–486
BCE
), King of Persia, also known as Darius the Great, attempted to conquer Greece but was ultimately defeated by the Athenians at Marathon in 490
BCE
.

25.
Pope Alexander’s son, Cesare Borgia, was appointed commander of the papal armies.

26.
See “How Duke Valentino Killed the Generals Who Conspired Against Him.”

27.
Naples was claimed by the French king Charles VIII, who held it briefly in 1495, but it was taken by the Spanish in 1503. Borgia had initially supported the French claim, but by 1503 proved to be “vacillating” in his support when he did not send troops as expected to help the town of Gaeta, which the Spanish army was besieging.

28.
August 18, 1504.

29.
Pope Julius II, who was Cardinal of San Piero ad Vincula before being elected to the pontificate.

CHAPTER EIGHT
O
F THOSE WHO BECOME PRINCES THROUGH EVIL

I must mention two other ways for a private citizen to become a prince that cannot be attributed to Fortune or skill, though I shall discuss one of them at greater length when I speak of republics. These are when a man obtains a principality in an evil or nefarious way, or when a private citizen, by the favor of his fellow citizens, becomes the prince of his state. Speaking of the first way, I shall offer two examples, one ancient, the other from our times, and shall leave it at that, as these examples will be enough for anyone constrained to imitate them.

When Agathocles the Sicilian became King of Syracuse, he did so not only as a private citizen, but as one who came from the lowliest and most humble circumstances. He was the son of a potter, and led a wicked life from first to last.
³⁰
And yet he combined his wickedness with such skill of mind and body that when he joined the army, he rose through the ranks to become Praetor of Syracuse. Once established in that position, he set about becoming prince and retaining his principality by means of violence, without depending on others for that which he had originally been granted by his fellow citizens. He conspired with Hamilcar the Carthaginian,
³¹
who was waging war in Sicily with his army, and one morning Agathocles called together the people and the senate of Syracuse as if to discuss important issues concerning the republic, and then at a signal to his soldiers had them kill all the senators and the richest men of the city
³²
Then he became the unchallenged prince of that city. And though the Carthaginians defeated him twice and finally besieged Syracuse, he managed to defend the city, and, leaving a part of his army to withstand the siege, left on a campaign with the rest to assault Africa. Within a short time he freed Syracuse from the siege and brought Carthage to its knees, forcing it to reach an agreement with him and to content itself with the possession of Africa, leaving Sicily to Agathocles.

If one weighs Agathocles’s actions and skill, there is not much that can be attributed to Fortune. As I have pointed out, he did not gain his principality through anyone’s favor, but rose to it through the ranks of the army with a thousand privations and dangers, and then kept possession of the principality through many bold and dangerous feats. And yet we cannot define as skillful killing one’s fellow citizens, betraying one’s friends, and showing no loyalty, mercy, or moral obligation. These means can lead to power, but not glory. Because if one considers Agathocles’s skill at plunging into and out of danger, and the greatness of his spirit in enduring and overcoming adversity, he cannot be judged inferior to the most excellent leaders. In other words, one cannot attribute to Fortune or skill what he attained without either of them.

In our own times, during the reign of Pope Alexander VI, we have the example of Oliverotto da Fermo. He had been orphaned as a child and raised by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in his early years had been sent to serve under Paolo Vitelli to master the military arts, so that he might attain a high rank in the army. When Paolo died, Oliverotto fought under Paolo’s brother Vitellozzo, and very quickly, being resourceful and vigorous in body and mind, became commander of Vitellozzo’s army. But he felt that serving under others was unbecoming. He decided to seize the town of Fermo with the support of Vitellozzo and the help of some of Fermo’s citizens, who preferred servitude to freedom for their city. Oliverotto wrote to his uncle Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many years, he wanted to return to see him and his town and reacquaint himself with his patrimony. He wrote that in all these years he had fought in order to acquire honor, and now he wanted his fellow citizens to see that he had not spent his time in vain. He wanted to return with honor, accompanied by a hundred friends and servants on horseback, and asked his uncle to ensure that the citizens of Fermo would receive him with ceremony, which would also reflect well on his uncle as his guardian. And Giovanni did not fail to show his nephew every courtesy. Having him received with honor by the citizens of Fermo, he quartered him and his men in his houses. After a few days, having waited to put into place what was necessary for his future wickedness, Oliverotto ordered a great feast, to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the foremost men of Fermo. After the courses had been eaten and the usual entertainments were over, Oliverotto artfully introduced delicate subjects, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare and of their campaigns. Giovanni and the others responded, and Oliverotto suggested that such delicate matters should be discussed in a more private place. He retired to a chamber with Giovanni and the other citizens, and no sooner had they seated themselves than soldiers emerged from a hiding place and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After the slaughter, Oliverotto mounted a horse and took over the town, besieging the supreme magistrate in his palace. The citizens were forced to obey him out of fear, and he made them form a new government with himself as prince. As everyone who would have opposed him was dead, they could not harm him, and Oliverotto reinforced his position with new civil and military laws. Within a year, he was secure in the town of Fermo and had become a source of fear for its neighbors. It would have been as hard to defeat him as to defeat Agathocles, had Oliverotto not let himself be deceived by Cesare Borgia, who, as I have mentioned, trapped the Orsini and the Vitelli in Sinigallia. It was in Sinigallia, a year after Oliverotto had murdered his uncle, that he was strangled along with Vitellozzo, who had been his tutor in skill and wickedness.

One might wonder how Agathocles and others like him, after countless betrayals and so much cruelty, could live so long and securely in their states and defend themselves from outside enemies, and why they were never conspired against by their citizens, whereas many others could not retain their states through cruelty, either in times of peace or in the uncertain times of war. I believe this depends upon whether cruelty is used well or badly. Cruelty can be called well used (if it is even permitted to use the word “well” in connection with evil) if it is executed at a single stroke out of the necessity to secure one’s power, and is then not continued but converted into the greatest possible benefit for one’s subjects. Badly used cruelty is cruelty that, even if initially limited, increases with time rather than subsiding. Those who follow the first path can maintain their position in their state with the blessing of God and man, as Agathocles did. The others cannot possibly survive.

A prince can conclude from this that when he conquers a state, he must weigh all the acts of cruelty that are necessary, and execute them all at a single stroke so they will not have to be repeated every day, and by not repeating them assure the people and win them over by subsequently benefiting them. Whoever proceeds otherwise, through fear or bad judgment, must always keep a knife at hand. He can never rely on his subjects, as they cannot feel secure under him. Therefore any cruelty has to be executed at once, so that the less it is tasted, the less it offends; while benefits must be dispensed little by little, so that they will be savored all the more. Primarily, a prince must live with his subjects in such a way that no incident, either good or bad, should make him change his course, because when bad times cause him to employ more stringent methods, it will be too late, nor will the good he does benefit him, because it will be judged to have been forced.

30.
Justin writes in
Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus
, Book XXII, chapter 1: “[Agathocles] rose to royal power from a birth that was humble and base. In fact, he was born in Sicily to a potter. His youth was no more honorable than his birth, for being remarkable for his beauty and physical charm, he lived for a long time by submitting himself to being ravished. Emerging from puberty, he transferred his lust from men to women. Having thus become notorious with both sexes, he changed his way of life to that of a mercenary.”

31.
A Carthaginian general fighting in Sicily, not to be confused with Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar (d. 229
BCE
), also a general in Sicily.

32.
Justin writes in
Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus
, Book XXII, chapter 2: “Having received from him [Hamilcar] five thousand African soldiers, he put to death the most powerful among the foremost citizens. Then he ordered the populace to assemble in the theater, feigning that he wished to redraw the constitution of the state, also calling together the senate in the Gymnasium, under the guise of laying the groundwork. Having set this up, he sent his troops to besiege the people, had all the senators slaughtered, and then proceeded to kill all the wealthiest and most prominent plebeians.”

CHAPTER NINE
O
F THE CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But let us consider the other alternative, when a private citizen becomes prince of his native state through the favor of his fellow citizens, and not through wickedness or some violence that proves intolerable to the citizens. Such a principality can be called a civil principality, since to acquire it the prince does not have to depend entirely on skill or Fortune, but rather on a fortunate astuteness. One acquires this principality through the favor of either the people or the nobles, because in every city there are two opposing humors. This arises from the fact that the nobles want to command and oppress the people, but the people do not want to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles.
³³
These two opposing impulses within a city will result in one of three outcomes: a principality, liberty, or anarchy.

The principality is brought about by the people or the nobility, depending on which has the opportunity. When the nobles see that they cannot stand up to the people, they put all their support behind one of their own, making him prince so they can satisfy their ambition in the safety of his shadow. And the people, finding that they cannot stand up to the nobility, put all their support behind one man and make him prince, in the hope that his authority will shield them.

A prince who obtains a state with the help of the people maintains his position with less difficulty than a prince who acquires it with the help of the nobility because in the latter case he is surrounded by men who consider themselves his equals and whom he therefore cannot command or govern as he pleases. But a prince who acquires a principality through the favor of the people is unhampered: Only a few in his circle are unready to obey him. Furthermore, one cannot satisfy the nobles in a manner that is just and does not harm the people, but one can so satisfy the people, because their aspirations are more just than those of the nobles: The nobles want to oppress them, but the people want only not to be oppressed. Moreover, a prince cannot shield himself against a populace that is hostile toward him, because there are too many of them; but he can shield himself against the nobles, as they are few in number.
³⁴
The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile populace is for them to abandon him, but from hostile noblemen he has also to fear their conspiring against him. Noblemen, having more foresight and cunning, tend to act in time to save themselves, and are quick to seek out those who they hope will prevail. The prince is constrained always to live with that same populace, but he can do well enough without those same noblemen, as he is able to make and unmake them at will, giving and taking away their power as he pleases.

To clarify this point, I propose that noblemen must be considered in two ways: Either they link themselves entirely to your destiny, or they do not. Those who link themselves to you and are not greedy should be honored and loved. Those who do not are acting out of pusillanimity and a natural lack of courage. You should make use of those among them who offer good counsel, because in prosperity they will bring you honor, while in difficult times you need not fear them. But if out of malicious design and ambition they do not align themselves with you, it is a sign that they are thinking more of themselves than of you. A prince must be on his guard against them. He should fear them as if they were declared enemies, because in adversity they will inevitably help to bring about his ruin.

And yet he who becomes prince through the favor of the people must keep the people on his side. This should be simple enough, as all they ask of him is that he not oppress them. But he who becomes prince through the favor of the nobility against the will of the people must make it a priority to win over the people, which is easy enough if he becomes their protector. Because men, when they encounter benevolence where they expected harm, show greater gratitude to their benefactor, and the populace becomes even more supportive than if the prince had acquired the state through their favor. And the prince can earn this favor in many ways, but as these vary greatly depending on the circumstances, one cannot lay down a fixed rule. I will only conclude that a prince must have the people on his side, otherwise he will not have support in adverse times.

Prince Nabis of Sparta fended off a siege led by the whole of Greece and an illustrious Roman army, managing to save the state and city of his birth.
³⁵
He overcame the danger, having to protect himself against only a few of his subjects, an endeavor that would have failed had the populace been against him.

And let nobody respond with the trite proverb that he who builds upon the masses builds upon sand, because this proverb holds only when a private citizen builds a foundation on the populace in the hope that they will come to his rescue when he is in trouble with magistrates or his enemies. In this case he might find himself disabused, as were the Gracchi in Rome and Giorgio Scali in Florence.
³⁶

But if a prince builds a foundation on the populace and can command, and is a man of courage unruffled in adversity who has taken his precautions, a man who has made himself popular with the people through his spirit and government, he will never be abandoned by the populace. Principalities tend to be vulnerable when they move from civil to absolute order, because princes command either directly or through magistrates. In the latter case, the prince finds his position weaker and more dangerous because he is at the mercy of citizens who have become magistrates. They can, particularly in adverse times, easily take the state away from him, either by abandoning him or by opposing him. Once this happens, the prince no longer has time to establish his absolute authority, because the populace are used to following the orders of the magistrates, and will not obey the prince’s orders during difficult times. In adversity, he will find that there is a lack of people he can trust, because a prince in his position cannot rely on his experience during times of peace, when citizens are in need of the state and fall all over each other with promises, eagerly proclaiming that they are willing to die for him when death is at a safe distance. But in adverse times, when the state needs its citizens, only a few are to be found. This experience is all the more dangerous in that it can be experienced only once. Therefore, a wise prince must find a way in which his citizens will consider him and the state to be indispensable in every circumstance and at all times. Then his citizens will be always faithful.

33.
See
Discourses
, Book I, chapter 5: “For without doubt, if one considers the respective aims of the nobles and the populace, one sees in the former a strong desire to dominate, and in the latter merely a desire not to be dominated.”

34.
See
Discourses
, Book I, chapter 16: “In fact, I consider those princes unfortunate who are compelled to resort to exceptional means to secure their state because the populace is their enemy, for he who has as his enemy the few can secure himself easily and without much turmoil, but he who has the whole populace as his enemy can never secure himself.”

35.
Nabis (d. 192
BCE
), the last king of an independent Sparta, managed to maintain his power despite the wars between Rome and Philip V of Macedon and their allies that were destabilizing the territories of all the Greek states.

36.
The Gracchi brothers were influential Roman statesmen whose reforms acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic. Giorgio Scali was one of the Florentine political figures who came to power after the popular Revolt of the Ciompi in 1378. Machiavelli writes in
Florentine Histories
(Book III, chapter 21) that as Scali was being executed by the populace he had championed, he “blamed himself for having set too much stock in the populace, which can be moved and corrupted by every voice, every act, every suspicion.” The fifteenth-century chronicler Piero Vagliente attributed to Giorgio Scali the “trite proverb” that Machiavelli quotes: “Giorgio Scali, who said that he who builds upon deferring to the masses builds upon shit.”