The Sword And The Olive (77 page)
32
Figures from Bar-Siman Tov,
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition
, p. 92 (table 4.1) and p. 97 (table 4.4).
33
M. Peled, “Ech lo Hitkonena Yisrael Le-milchama” [How Israel Did Not Prepare for War],
Maarachot
289/290 (October 1983): 25-28.
34
Cf. the calculations of Bar-Siman Tov,
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition
, p. 91 ff., regarding the types of Egyptian fire and their relative effectiveness.
35
The operation is described in some detail in M. Eldar,
Shayetet 11
[Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), pp. 55-59.
36
Some additional operations of the same kind are briefly described in Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
, pp. 113-114.
37
Ch. Nadel, “Hafalat Ha-kochot Ha-meyuchadim shel TSAHAL Be-milchemet Hahatasha” [Israel’s Special Forces in the War of Attrition], M.A. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1990. Nadel was a special forces officer who later rose to major general.
38
For Nasser’s plans during this period see Schueftan,
Hatasha
, chap. 5.
39
Y. Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
[A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, pp. 261-263. For quotes from other key Israeli decisionmakers see Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 120 ff.
40
Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 250 ff., using a variety of Egyptian sources.
41
Cf. A. Price,
Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare
(London: Macdonald’s, 1967).
42
Cf. E. O’Ballance,
The Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-1970
(London: Faber and Faber, 1974), pp. 123-124.
43
Quoted in Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 265.
44
Figure from E. N. Luttwak and D. Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
(London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 325
.
45
Bar Lev estimate, in G. Yaakobi,
Ke-chut Ha-seara
[By a Hair’s Breadth] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1989), p. 157.
46
Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 365.
47
The best source is once again Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 267, which makes use of all the available Israeli, Egyptian, and U.S. sources.
48
For a blow-by-blow account of the way it was done see E. Zeira,
Milchemet Yom Hakippurim, Mitos mul Metsiut
[The Yom Kippur War: Myth Versus Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1993), p. 34 ff.
49
Ezer Weizman,
On Eagles’ Wings
(Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 265.
CHAPTER 13
1
S. Rolbant,
The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army
(New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 244.
2
For a blow-by-blow account of terrorist activities and Israeli responses see E. O’Ballance,
Arab Guerrilla Power, 1968-1972
(London: Faber and Faber, 1974).
3
Dayan lecture, August 9, 1973, quoted in N. Bar Tov,
Dado
:
Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom
[Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 274.
4
Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, pp. 179, 202-203. There are some additional details of the plan in E. N. Luttwak, “Defense Planning in Israel: A Brief Retroperspective,” in S. G. Neuman, ed.,
Defense-Planning in Less-Industrialized States
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984), p. 140.
5
Cf. the account in B. Kedar,
Sippuro shel Gdud Machats
[The Story of “Machats” Battalion] (Tel Aviv: Tamuz, 1975), p. 11.
6
Abdel Ghani el Gamasy,
The October War
(Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 148.
7
Dayan to
Yediot Acharonot
, August 18, 1972.
8
G. Yaakobi,
Ke-chut Ha-seara
[By a Hair’s Breadth] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1989), p. 170.
9
For the preparations that were made on this occasion see Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, pp. 238-248.
10
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 17.
11
A. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
(New York: Collins, 1978), p. 237.
12
Cf. M. van Creveld,
Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict
(New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 109; also Levite,
Be-einei Ha-aravim
, pp. 42, 76, plus the sources quoted in both works.
13
See the sources quoted in Levite,
Be-einei Ha-aravim,
p. 43.
14
Cf. his own account in Saad el Shazly,
The Crossing of the Suez
(San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), p. 27 ff.
15
For some figures see Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, pp. 282, 286.
16
M. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
[Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 570.
18
Quotation from a GS meeting, September 17, 1973, in Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 287.
19
For the details see Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, pp. 15-16.
20
Cf. Meir,
My Life
(Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1975, p. 347 ff.
21
Cf. M. Negbi,
Namer shel Niyar
[Paper Tiger] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Ha-poalim, 1985), pp. 87-88.
22
According to Brigadier General Shalev, head of IDF intelligence/research, and Zeira’s own office manager, a lieutenant colonel whose name was also Shalev; see Bar Tov,
Dado,
vol. 1, p. 305.
23
Shazly,
The Crossing of the Suez
, pp. 206-207.
24
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 20.
25
Shazly,
The Crossing of the Suez
, p. 213, says that the evacuation took the Egyptians by surprise and almost betrayed their plans.
26
Cf. U. Bar Joseph, “Israel’s Intelligence Failure in 1973,”
Security Studies
4:3 (Spring 1995): 584-609.
27
Quoted in A. Braun,
Moshe Dayan Be-milchemt Yom Ha-kippurim
[Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1993), p. 58.
28
E. Zeira,
Milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim, Mitos mul Metsiut
[The Yom Kippur War: Myth Versus Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1993), p. 215.
29
For a blow-by-blow account see Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 11 ff.
30
Cf. Gamasy,
The October War
, p. 180.
31
Braun,
Moshe Dayan
, pp. 79, 81.
32
Cf. Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, pp. 177-178.
33
For the lack of information affecting Gonen at this time cf. M. van Creveld,
Command in War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 205-206.
34
Brig. Gen. Emmanuel Shaked as quoted in Zeira,
Milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim
, p. 217. The verb
li-dfok
is normal IDF slang for “to kill” or “to fuck.”
35
In these attacks Adan lost twenty-seven killed, five tanks, and eight half-tracks. Lt. Col. Nachum and Lt. Col. Tsvi, “Lechima Be-kommando Mitsri Be-milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim” [Fighting Egyptian Commandos During the 1973 War],
Maarachot
327 (November-December 1992): 23.
36
E. Shimshi,
Seara Be-Oktober
[Storm in October] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), p. 14.
37
No record of this meeting has ever come to light. It is, however, described in A. Adan,
On the Banks of the Suez
(London: Arms and Armor, 1980), pp. 95-100; and Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 2, pp. 73-75.
38
Cf. van Creveld,
Command in War
, pp. 213-218, for a blow-by-blow account of IDF “staff work” during these hours.
39
Adan,
On the Banks of the Suez
, p. 119.
40
Cf. Sharon’s own account in A. Sharon,
Warrior
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 301-302.
41
For that commander’s own story see A. Yaguri,
Le-hiyot Itam, Kulam Sheli
[To Be with Them, They Are All Mine] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1979).
42
Kedar,
Sippuro shel Gdud Machats
, p. 23.
43
See the firsthand account in ibid., p. 28 ff.
44
The Egyptians later claimed that it was a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that alerted the Israelis to the location of the seam; Gamasy,
The October War
, p. 278.
45
Sharon,
Warrior
, 307-309.
46
Details in Braun,
Moshe Dayan
, pp. 139-140.
47
Cf. the detailed account in E. Rozen, “Lama Hufkera Chativat Barak?” [Why Was “Barak” Brigade Abandoned to Its Fate?”
Maariv
weekend magazine, September 24, 1993, pp. 32-33.
48
See his own account in R. Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
[A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 130.
49
Agranat Report (Jerusalem: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 1035.
50
Braun,
Moshe Dayan
, p. 94.
51
See M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 130-134, for the details.
52
Personal communication by Lt. Col. David Chillion.
53
A. Kahalani,
Oz 77
[Strength 77] (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1977), p. 104 ff., is a blow-by-blow account of the battle.
54
Ch. Herzog,
The War of Atonement
(London: Futura, 1975), pp. 112-113.
55
For this interpretation see van Creveld,
Nuclear Proliferation
, pp. 101-102; S. Aronson,
The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East
(New York: State University of New York, 1992), pp. 143-149.
56
Tamir, lecture, Hebrew University, December 1974.
57
Personal communication from one of Lanner’s battalion commanders, Lt. Col. Amram Lazar. The Iraqis have described this episode in Ts. Ofer, ed.,
Tsva Iraq Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim
[The Iraqi Army in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1986), pp. 110-112; according to them it was this attack that saved Damascus.
58
Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 2, p. 147.
59
M. Heikal,
The Road to Ramadan
(London: Sphere Books, 1974), p. 224.
60
Gamasy,
The October War
, p. 266 ff.
61
Figures from Herzog,
The War of Atonement
, p. 206, and Gamasy,
The October War
, p. 277; for once, the Israeli and Egyptian accounts agree.
62
Braun,
Moshe Dayan
, p. 96.
63
E. Amber, “Chel Ha-avir Ha-yisraeli Bi-krav Ha-yabasha Be-milchemet Yom Hakippurim” [The IAF’s Participation in the Ground Battle in the Yom Kippur War], in U. Milstein,
Ha-tslicha she-lo Hayta
[The Crossing That Wasn’t] (Tel Aviv: Golan, 1992), p. 284 ff.
64
Braun,
Moshe Dayan
, p. 141.
65
Peled lecture, Nevatim Air Base, January 16, 1988.
66
Shazly,
The Crossing of the Suez
, p. 248
.
67
Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 2, p. 216.
68
See Shazly’s own account in
The Crossing of the Suez
, p. 400 ff.
69
Cf. B. Telem, “Naval Lessons of the Yom Kippur War,” in L. Williams, ed.,
Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict
(Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 231 ff.
CHAPTER 14
1
The most detailed account is S. Nakdimon,
Svirut Nemucha
(Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1982), chaps. 1-10; also Y. Ben Porat,
Neila
[Lock-In] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1991). In 1973 Brig. Gen. Ben Porat was the Israeli intelligence officer in charge of signals intelligence (SIGINT).